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 Good Governance and Growth in Africa: 
What can we learn from Tanzania? 
 
Hazel Sophia Gray and Mushtaq Husain Khan1
 
 
 
 
Popular struggles for social justice in Africa and elsewhere are often couched in terms 
of demands for better governance. But the new consensus over ‘good governance’ 
supported by international financial institutions represents a much narrower 
programme of reform based on neoclassical economic theory. This agenda focuses on 
developing governance attributes in Africa that are theoretically supposed to enhance 
growth by making markets more efficient. Some of these governance capabilities 
(such as measures to improve government accountability or lower corruption) appear 
to coincide with goals supported by social justice movements for better governance. 
But the reasons for supporting these are very different in the official good governance 
agenda, and the way they are supported can make the achievement of social goals 
even more difficult. This chapter outlines the theoretical and methodological basis of 
the good governance agenda and sets out an alternative understanding of the links 
between growth and governance in Africa.  
 
The good governance reforms are based on a particular way of understanding 
economic development that draws on a very specific and partial reading of new 
institutional economics and new political economy. It assumes that political stability 
and economic development in developing countries can be based on institutions of 
political representation, accountability and market competition. In making these 
assumptions it ignores not only much of the history of economic, political and social 
transformations through which advanced societies have emerged, it also reads 
economic and political theory very selectively. The danger is that in confusing 
desirable outcomes (such as low corruption, a good rule of law and accountability) 
with the preconditions that are required to achieve political stability and economic 
growth in poor countries, the good governance agenda can in many contexts result in 
lost opportunities for meaningful reform or even worse. The first section examines 
some of these theoretical issues and the second section examines the implementation 
of the good governance agenda in Tanzania and some of its effects. 
 
1. Good governance: Some Theoretical Issues 
The roots of the modern ‘good governance’ agenda lie in theoretical developments 
within the new institutional economics developed by North and Thomas (1973), North 
(1990), Olson (1982; 1997; 2000), Williamson (1985), Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
and Bates (1984; 1989; 2001). These models established the importance of stable 
property rights for the functioning of a market economy. Good governance also drew 
on theories of rents and rent seeking that date back to the work of Krueger (1974), 
Posner (1975) and Bhagwati (1982). These theories claimed subsidies, market 
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restrictions and other sources of ‘rents’ or politically created incomes were highly 
damaging for market economies. And finally, it drew on new political economy 
theories that supported democracies on the grounds that they helped to establish 
property rights and reduced rent seeking North (1990), Olson (2000). The theoretical 
argument was that democratic accountability reduced the possibility of corruption and 
rent seeking, this in turn enabled a rule of law and stable property rights to be 
enforced, and these were essential for reducing transaction costs in markets, thereby 
allowing economic growth (Khan 2004, 2006b, 2007).  
 
These theoretical arguments were backed up by numerous econometric studies that 
purported to show a positive relationship between improvements in good governance 
and various measures of economic performance, in particular economic growth. 
While governance quality is difficult to measure directly, the new paradigm has been 
helped by the development of proxy measures for complex governance capabilities 
such as the rule of law and the stability of property rights. These proxies involve both 
‘objective’ measures such as counting the number of corruption cases brought to court 
as well as ‘subjective’ measures that often use survey data from credit risk agencies 
who interview business people about their perceptions and experience of different 
aspects of governance.  
 
The best known of these data sets are the World Wide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
produced by the World Bank but many data sets are now available. In terms of these 
measures, most countries in Africa perform badly on all of the key areas of concern of 
the good governance agenda. The WGI indicators place the vast majority of African 
countries in the bottom 50th percentile of their six dimensions of governance meaning 
that Africa performs worse than any other region, except the former Soviet Union 
(World Bank 2008). In the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by 
Transparency International 30 out of the 47 countries where corruption was measured 
in Africa were found to have rampant corruption while only three, Botswana, Cape 
Verde and Mauritius, scored above the global average for corruption (Transparency 
International 2008).  
 
In many ways it has become difficult to confront the argument for the good 
governance agenda in Africa. This is partly because it has attained the status of 
‘conventional wisdom’ in much of the discourse on development and has been 
espoused by African leaders, reflected in commitments in NEPAD and the AU, as 
well as being central to donor conditionality (Mkapa 2008). More importantly, it taps 
into the popular aspirations of millions across the continent who face the burden of 
poor governance on a daily basis and who want their leaders to be held to account 
through genuinely democratic political systems. Nevertheless, despite the 
proliferation of quantitative studies and policy conditionality based on its conclusions, 
serious questions have been raised about the validity of the good governance agenda, 
both from within the mainstream and from heterodox economic approaches.  
 
A major area of dispute concerns the empirical evidence, particularly the econometric 
models, used to support the good governance agenda. A basic problem is that the 
econometric approaches cannot definitively show that good governance is required for 
growth rather than the reverse that growth and rising levels of per capita income are 
necessary for sustainable improvements in good governance (Khan 2004). In 
particular, case studies of successful development in poor countries show that none of 
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these countries achieved significant improvements in good governance before they 
began their economic transformations. Think of South Korea and Taiwan in the 
1960s, Thailand and Malaysia in the 1980s, China in the 1990s amongst many other 
examples. The relationships found in many econometric studies between good 
governance and growth could therefore be spurious, caused by measurement error, 
reverse causation, poor model specification and data mining by dedicated researchers 
looking for combinations of countries and periods which support their theories. In 
addition, econometric studies that question these results are typically ignored.  
 
For instance, Sachs et al. (2004) provide an econometric analysis that standardizes the 
measurement of governance by level of income and finds that, in fact, many African 
countries are actually well governed according to their level of income. And while the 
Sachs et al. study finds a weak relationship between improvements in good 
governance and growth when all countries are looked at together, African countries 
have a more significant negative dummy. This can be interpreted in two ways. Either 
governance does not matter much for African countries, which is the interpretation 
that the authors support. Alternatively, the governance capabilities that the good 
governance approach focuses on may be less important for developing countries and 
the governance weaknesses that African countries suffer from may be very different 
from the ones identified in the good governance approach. The second possibility is 
supported by historical analyses of the governance capabilities that allowed a few 
developing countries to emerge from poverty to prosperity in the last fifty years.  
 
Heterodox economics (and some developments within mainstream neoclassical 
economics) provide the theoretical framework for explaining the importance of these 
alternative governance capabilities for achieving prosperity and therefore eventually 
achieving good governance characteristics. In the context of significant market 
failures in developing countries, it is not surprising that growth has depended on state 
capabilities of addressing market failures (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990). Interventions 
to correct market failures inevitably create rents, because rents can be defined as 
incomes that are directly the result of state interventions (Khan 2000b, 2000a). Thus, 
far from requiring the removal of all rents and rent seeking, success in development 
may require state capabilities to manage rents and rent seeking such that growth-
enhancing rents could be managed and growth-reducing rents could be removed.  
 
This heterodox approach has focused on the critical importance of rents and 
interventions that successful developing countries have used to overcome market 
failures limiting the acquisition of technology and the organization of learning-by-
doing in productive activities. Growth in developing countries requires catching up 
through the acquisition of new technologies and learning to use these new 
technologies rapidly. Learning how to use modern technologies is an expensive 
process that entails extra costs until higher levels of productivity are achieved. In 
developing countries the weakness of markets and in particular capital markets means 
that these processes face significant market failures and success requires state action 
to facilitate technology acquisition and indeed to overcome other significant market 
failures (Khan 2007, 2008). Addressing these problems requires significant 
governance capacities in managing rents but these capabilities are typically entirely 
ignored in the good governance approach.  
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The problem with intervention and rent-creation is that some rent seeking is 
inevitable. In developing countries much of this rent seeking may be illegal, and take 
the form of different types of corruption. Some types of corruption impose costs but 
do not significantly distort the intervention while other types of corruption can distort 
the implementation of the intervention the extent that potentially beneficial effects are 
wiped out or even reversed. Growth-enhancing governance therefore requires 
institutional and political capabilities for limiting the damaging variants of corruption 
even if overall corruption cannot be significantly reduced in the short to medium term 
(Khan 2006a). Most of the examples of successful rent creation of this sort come from 
Asia however this type of rent creation was also important in many African 
development plans prior to the liberalisation drive of the 1980s (Mkandawire 2001). 
However, in many cases across Africa, state-created rents served no purpose other 
than to create incomes for state functionaries and politicians. Nevertheless, the drive 
to wipe out all state created rents has reduced the institutional and political capacity of 
many African countries to deal with significant market failures (Khan and Gray 
2006). 
 
However, corruption in developing countries is not just related to potentially growth-
enhancing rents. If that was the only problem, it would be possible to address this 
problem by gradually legalizing the rent seeking associated with these rents, in much 
the same way as the rent seeking associated with many socially desirable rents in 
advanced is legalized through the political process. The more fundamental problem is 
that many aspects of poor governance in developing countries are linked to 
interventions and rents that are potentially necessary for growth or political stability 
but which cannot be easily legalized. Two important types of such interventions are 
the ‘interventions’ that manage non-market asset allocations and that managed 
political stability in developing countries (Khan 2004, 2006a, 2006b).  
 
Non-market asset transfers are sometimes described as primitive accumulation and 
this process has implications that are very similar to conventional state-created rents. 
Primitive accumulation in low income countries is driven by the fact that many 
critical assets, in particular land, are in low productivity traditional sectors and as a 
result of their low productivity, their owners do not have the resources to pay for the 
definition and protection of clear property rights. In the course of economic 
transformation, the transactions that can re-allocate resources to emerging productive 
sectors are often not possible through conventional market processes precisely 
because property titles are missing or badly defined or heavily contested. Much of the 
significant asset re-allocations in developing countries happen through political 
processes rather than through market ones. These non-market processes can be legal 
(such as land reform), quasi legal (political influence guiding market transfers) or 
entirely illegal (asset grabbing). But clearly quite apart from the avarice of the 
politically powerful, there are structural reasons why market-based asset transfers 
cannot be relied upon in developing countries. Once again, critical governance 
capabilities are required to ensure that these non-market transfers are socially 
beneficial and not socially damaging. In contrast, the good governance approach 
urges developing countries to achieve the property right stability that is impossible to 
achieve at early stages of development.  
 
Primitive accumulation in African countries manifests itself in various ways including 
land policies, the framework of regulation surrounding natural resource extraction, 
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compulsory purchase orders and appropriations undertaken as part of privatisation 
policies. In some cases even forms of taxation, subsidies and price fixing assist forms 
of primitive accumulation as they accelerate the transfer of assets to particular classes 
or groups. Historical evidence suggests that in high growth developers property rights 
were not stable across the board but rather assets were systematically transferred to 
productive investors while in less dynamic developers, assets remained in the hands 
of unproductive expropriators (Qian; 2003, Brenner; 1985). The governance policy 
question for many Africa countries is why primitive accumulation often remains stuck 
in cycles of predation without the emergence of a more productive asset structure.  
 
The process of political stabilisation also involves significant transfers in all countries 
and these are rents by definition. In most rich countries political stabilisation is 
primarily achieved through redistribution of fiscal resources through open transfers 
discussed in Khan (2005). Given the limited scope for fiscal transfers and the lack of 
political legitimacy of many of the groups that pose the greatest threat to political 
stability in low income countries, political stabilisation typically cannot be achieved 
solely through the creation of legal rents. Instead, political stability in developing 
countries depends on off-budget transfers and non-legal rent creation for critical 
clients and constituencies through the patron-client networks operated by political 
parties and groups in power. The state’s capacity to manage political stabilisation in 
these ways is clearly critical for economic growth, and the types of rents that are 
created also have an effect on growth because some types of rents can be very 
damaging while others are much less so. It appears that political rent creation is very 
damaging in many African countries, descending in some cases to conditions of civil 
war and predation by competing groups of warlords.  
 
The assumption of the good governance agenda is that problems of political 
stabilization can be solved through democratization and the attempt to manage 
political stability through fiscal transfers as in advanced countries. This prescription is 
not very useful because the economic basis of such a fiscal strategy does not yet exist. 
Developing countries, including African countries can only tax a much smaller share 
of their GDP because of the small share of modern activities, and their per capita 
incomes are also much lower. Thus, clientelism in Africa is not special at all but 
rather a feature of all developing countries. Unfortunately, a number of authors have 
pointed to specific African cultural factors or the absence of democracy in Africa to 
explain the prevalence of patron-client politics and ‘neo-patrimonialism’ (Hyden and 
Williams 1994; Médard 2002). Rather, while patron-client politics are common to all 
developing countries, the success of particular patron-client structures in achieving 
stability and growth differs significantly.  
 
The problems of political stabilization in developing countries therefore have to be 
addressed through other types of governance capabilities that draw on the experience 
of successful countries in the developing world. Whether democratic or not, 
successful developing countries have had high levels of political corruption and 
political stabilization through patron-client networks. Adapting their governance 
capabilities to the conditions of specific African countries is a very different task from 
the exclusive focus on democratization and accountability that the good governance 
approach espouses.  
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Weaknesses in growth-enhancing governance in Africa may have more to do with 
state fragmentation. The institutional fragmentation of the state can result in predatory 
behaviour because different parts of the state can behave in uncoordinated ways, 
thereby resulting in short term predatory behaviour. The historical reasons for state 
fragmentation in Africa have been studied by Mamdani (1996) who argues that 
different patterns of direct and indirect rule by colonial governments established 
fragmented and bifurcated states in Africa. The problem of institutional fragmentation 
cannot however be solved by simply changing formal organisational structures of the 
state but is more likely to require fundamental changes in the political configurations 
underpinning the state.  
 
The political fragmentation of the powerful classes and groups underpinning the state 
is often an important underlying cause of persistent institutional fragmentation of the 
state. Political fragmentation in developing countries frequently takes the form of 
multiple well-organized factions each seeking to gain power and rents for itself but 
failing to achieve enough stability to take a long-term view. As a result political 
competition can result in the creation of many damaging rents in the process of 
primitive accumulation and political stabilization. Somewhat different political 
organizations that can achieve greater political stability either through the inclusion of 
the most powerful groups within a single party or the emergence of a small number of 
equally powerful groups that have a credible prospect of cycling in and out of power. 
In these cases, political stabilization and primitive accumulation can lead to much 
more developmental rents. Changing the political organization of factions in these 
ways fall well outside the remit of most good governance type reforms. However 
differences in governance capabilities in these areas are probably much more 
important in explaining the differential performance of developing countries than 
good governance capabilities which are missing in virtually all developing countries. 
The next section explores some of these issues in the context of the good governance 
agenda in Tanzania. 
 
2. Good governance and Tanzania 
After 20 years of economic and political reforms, including market liberalisation, the 
introduction of multiparty elections and extensive transparency and accountability 
reforms, Tanzania is often described as one of the more successful examples of good 
governance reforms in Africa (Utz 2007). At the start of the reform process Tanzania 
was identified as having poor governance across the whole spectrum of state activities 
(World Bank 2001) and the Presidential Inquiry into Corruption identified 
widespread corruption at all levels of government (United Republic of Tanzania 
1996). Major efforts were made to reduce rent seeking within the realm of public 
finance. Success in this area has been rewarded with high levels of foreign aid which 
have been increasingly channelled as direct budget support through the government’s 
budgetary system (United Republic of Tanzania 2005). A ring fenced and very 
generous fiscal incentive structure was introduced to attract foreign investment into 
natural resource extraction which triggered a massive inflow of FDI into the sector, 
making Tanzania the fifth largest recipient of FDI on the continent.  
 
In more recent years, some progress also seems to have been made in addressing 
cases of grand corruption involving senior politicians and business people. In 2007 
the Prime Minister resigned over allegations of corruption over a contract for private 
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power provision and the governor of the central bank resigned over allegations of the 
theft of billions of shillings of government funds from the Bank of Tanzania in 2006. 
Cases were also brought to court against two former finance ministers and the ex-
permanent secretary of the ministry of finance over abuses of public office. Overall, 
improvements in governance are credited as part of the reason for Tanzania’s 
improving rates of GDP growth, from an average 2% during the period from 1985 to 
1995 to over 5% for the period from 1996 to 2005. 
 
The story of Tanzania’s success with good governance reforms is however more 
complicated than this picture would suggest. While certain areas of poor governance 
appear to have been effectively addressed through market promoting reforms and by 
enhancing the transparency and accountability of the state, there are critical areas of 
governance in Tanzania that have either not been affected or that fall outside the good 
governance agenda completely. These critical areas include land management and 
industrial policy and natural resource management. The reason for this differentiated 
performance can be traced both to the nature of policy advice but also to the 
institutional and political configuration of the state.  
 
Good Governance Successes 
Probably the most successful areas of good governance reform in Tanzania have been 
in public finances. Initially reforms of public finance focussed on neo-liberal 
macroeconomic stabilisation with cuts in public expenditure to reduce inflation, 
extensive privatisation and the ‘rationalisation’ of the tax system to promote private 
sector growth and foreign investment. Drastic cuts in government spending were 
initiated and government expenditures as a percentage of GDP fell from 27% in 1992 
to 11% by 1998. The inflation rate was brought down from 32.4% in 1986 to 14.4% 
by 1998 (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). From the mid 1990s these stabilisation 
reforms were accompanied by good governance reforms that sought to address the 
pervasive corruption, lack of transparency and accountability, inefficient market 
distortions and endemic rent seeking affecting public finances (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1996; World Bank 2001; United Republic of Tanzania 2003, 2004).  
 
The budget process was seen to be highly politicized and numerous cases of 
corruption both on the revenue and expenditure side of the budget were documented 
by the Presidential Inquiry into Corruption (United Republic of Tanzania 1996; 
World Bank 2001). The cases identified involved bureaucratic and political corruption 
and even cases of outright predation and theft. On the expenditure side of the budget, 
there appeared to be significant ‘off budget’ expenditures not accounted for to the 
public or covered in the official budget document (World Bank 2001). Off budget 
expenditures are notoriously difficult to identify given their covert nature but in 
Tanzania they may have included loans to the ruling party, hidden government 
projects and aid funded projects that were not included in the budget estimates. 
 
These weaknesses were identified as a major constraint on Tanzania’s development 
objectives (World Bank 2001) and public expenditure reforms featured increasingly in 
donor conditionality. This was also driven by the shift amongst Tanzania’s largest 
donors in aid modality away from project based finance to direct (or ‘general’) budget 
support (United Republic of Tanzania 2005). The grant of aid money into the general 
budget allowed greater aid flows to be directed to African countries like Tanzania, but 
to make this politically acceptable to taxpayers in advanced countries providing the 
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aid, a lot of effort was put into aligning developing country budget priorities to 
development commitments contained in the IMF/World Bank approved Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. An array of complementary reform programmes including the 
Civil Service Reform Programme, the Public Financial Management Reform 
Programme, the Public Expenditure Review, Legal Sector Reform Programme and the 
Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Programme were introduced. These led to 
extensive institutional and organisational changes in the ways that public finances 
operated. 
 
In 1996 major institutional reforms of the revenue authority were introduced. The 
aims of the reform were to remove political influence, raise salaries and provide 
greater transparency and accountability of tax officials. Control of the revenue 
authority was removed from the Ministry of Finance. The Tanzania Revenue 
Authority (TRA) was established as an independent institution in order to insulate the 
TRA from political pressure and to move it outside the control of the civil service. 
Existing staff were dismissed and though most were subsequently re-employed, this 
was on different terms with more attractive wages and easier processes for dismissal. 
The aim was to raise the opportunity cost of corruption for bureaucrats. The tax 
exemption regime also underwent significant reforms to reduce the overall number of 
exemptions and to increase transparency in the exemption process. Subsequently, 
there was a significant fall in exemptions granted directly to private individuals and 
companies from around 35% of total exemptions in 1998 to around 11% in 2003. But 
there has been a sharp increase in the number of exemptions granted through the 
Tanzania Investment Centre from around 12% in 1998 to 35% in 2003 (Levin 2005).  
 
Major reforms of the public expenditure management system included the 
introduction of the cash budget, which limited payments to available cash on a 
monthly basis, and the introduction of a centralised computerized payments system 
through the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS). Transparency and 
accountability were strengthened with the development of a medium-term expenditure 
framework (MTEF) and the establishment of the Public Expenditure Review (PER) 
with government and donor participation. An expenditure tracking system was put in 
place to reduce leakages at service delivery level. Further, efforts were made to put a 
greater proportion of the previously ‘off budget’ aid financed projects through the 
official system (United Republic of Tanzania 2001). Annual reviews by the Controller 
and Auditor General pointed to significant improvement in the financial management 
of the budget, with fewer audit queries over time (United Republic of Tanzania 2007). 
Successive Public Expenditure Reviews have also reported a fall in off budget 
expenditures. 
 
The initial outcome of the revenue reforms was a decline in corruption and an 
increase in reported revenue from 11% of GDP in 1995/96 to more than 12% in 
1996/97. However in three subsequent years tax revenue declined as a percentage of 
GDP and there were reports of corruption increasing again within the revenue 
authority (Fjeldstad 2002). While tax revenues as a percentage of GDP started to rise 
again after 2000, the tax to GDP ratio remained low compared to other African 
countries with a similar economic structure. Cross-country analyses of tax-revenue 
performance suggest that Tanzania should be capable of generating tax-revenue of 
around 18% of GDP (Bevan 2001) rather than the 11 – 13% that has been the norm 
since the reforms (Levin 2005). Tax buoyancy has also remained low, suggesting that 
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tax evasion and discretionary exemptions were still having a major impact on 
reducing tax revenue (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). Political scandals concerning 
exemptions have also continued through the reform period. Some of the forms of rent 
seeking within the revenue system therefore appear to be much more difficult to root 
out with these types of governance reforms.  
 
Similarly, while expenditure reforms have undoubtedly reduced some forms of 
political rent seeking in the budget, there are still some areas that remain beyond the 
influence of the good governance agenda. For example, some areas of government 
activity such as Defence, Police, the Prime Minister’s office and the State House have 
their own budgeting systems and are not on-line within the IFMS system. Further, 
there have been a number of examples of large and in some cases dubious purchases 
outside the official budgetary process including the purchase of a national air traffic 
control system from the British company BAE, the construction of a national stadium 
and new parliamentary buildings that were not subject to the official government-
donor scrutiny process of the PER. Thus, the claim that all off-budget expenditures 
have been eradicated requires further investigation. 
 
Nevertheless, rent seeking in public finance appears to have been significantly 
modified by the governance reform agenda. There are however, other areas of rent 
seeking that have not been so amenable to these sorts of reforms. The focus on 
removing rents may have weakened the chances of building up capacity to manage 
other forms of rent processes in areas critical to Tanzania’s growth prospects. Further, 
Tanzania’s capacities to reduce certain forms of rent seeking are not simply about 
transparency and accountability but also relate to underlying political features of 
Tanzania. The underlying political drivers of rent seeking are important to understand 
in order to identify alternative strategies of growth-enhancing governance reform. 
 
Perhaps the most important area where rent reduction strategies appear to have had 
adverse effects on developing the capacity to manage vital rent processes is in 
technology acquisition, in particular in manufacturing. As in most developing 
countries, trade policy has become the central focus of industrialization. Tanzanian 
manufacturing suffered severe disinvestment for most of the period of liberalisation 
but started to pick up from the late 1990s. However this subsequent growth was 
overwhelmingly in low value added manufacturing. Most of the previous tools of 
industrial policy to encourage diversification and productivity growth were jettisoned 
as cumulative reforms have restricted the role of the state to provide at best a much 
narrower range of trade related incentives to the manufacturing sector. The major 
initiative in this area was the introduction of Economic Processing Zones (EPZs) in 
2002 and the launch of the Mini-Tiger Plan in December 2004.  
 
The EPZs initiative suffered from a number of critical limitations. This was partly 
because while the legal framework for the provision of incentives was in place, the 
state was not able to ensure the quality and reliability of services available in the 
EPZs. In 2005, of the three EPZs established in Dar es Salaam, only one had 
sufficient infrastructure. Basic facilities such as electricity and roads were lacking in 
the other two (World Bank 2005). Unreliable power and water supplies and 
undependable infrastructure, expensive administration costs and high raw material 
costs were listed as reasons for the lack of investment in these EPZs (World Bank 
2005). The central state was clearly aware of these deficiencies but lacked the 
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political capability to induce the appropriate agencies of the state to provide the 
required services.  
 
Another area where the state appears to lack essential capabilities for managing rent 
processes is in the vital area of natural resources. Natural resources potentially 
generate significant rents and African states need to develop capabilities for 
negotiating a fair share of these rents for the national economy and for managing the 
revenues coming from natural resources for long-term economic development. While 
the Tanzanian investment framework for natural resources offered relatively secure 
property rights and low taxes and did attract a large inflow of FDI into the sector, 
there are serious concerns that the state was too generous in its terms and agreed to a 
very low share of the rents for the domestic economy (Butler 2004). While 
government revenues have increased from mining, they are still relatively low at 
around 3% of GDP and significantly behind the target of 10% of GDP. In 2006 the 
Government launched a review of the terms offered to mining companies. 
Subsequently there were a number of ‘goodwill’ side payments by the mining 
companies to the Government (Mines and Communities 2007) and in March 2007 the 
review concluded that there was no basis for a change in the terms applicable to 
foreign investors in the mining sector.  
 
There has also been little progress on the generation of backward and forward 
linkages from the mining sector, despite the intentions expressed in the Mining 
Policy. The aim was to expand the lapidary industry to encourage higher value added 
activities. The policy faced critical problems in terms of implementation. The 
intention to impose a tax on the export of uncut Tanzanite was not seen through. 
Previous initiatives to promote lapidary activities such as the 1996 government 
regulation which sought to require all foreign dealers to set up lapidary operations 
also failed. Further, the intention to grant EPZ status to lapidary industries has not 
received the required practical support from the Government (Lange 2006). 
 
Another crucial area where governance capabilities need to be developed is for 
managing the rents associated with land policy. The Government introduced a legal 
framework for land which attempted to address the dual challenges of securing social 
justice for small holders and traditional land owners while creating an efficient market 
for land. These competing pressures meant that the implementation of the new land 
policy has been quite confused and in reality ‘land reform’ has often been occurring 
through the actions of private individuals engaging in illegal or quasi-legal non-
market transfers with local political support, but without the direct oversight or 
planning of the central state. These types of transfers are clearly a variant of primitive 
accumulation. Over the period of liberalisation local level struggles over land have 
become more important as accumulation strategies have shifted downwards as the 
economic activities of the central state have been reduced (Gibbon 1995; Kelsall 
2000).  
 
Thus, village level elites, working with individual central state politicians have often 
used the new laws which strengthen Village Council control over community based 
lands to transfer property rights to new investors. The lack of oversight means that 
these transfers have not necessarily been in line with Tanzania’s development plans. 
As we described earlier, there are good theoretical reasons to expect these land 
transfers at early stages of development to have a large non-market element. The real 
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question for countries like Tanzania is whether these transfers are likely to lead to the 
eventual emergence of productive sectors and the social cost of achieving such a 
transformation. 
 
The Political Context 
The apparent capacity of the Tanzanian state to control or limit some forms of rents 
while struggling to manage other rent processes relates both to the policy imperatives 
it has worked under, but also point to underlying institutional and political 
opportunities and challenges for the state. One of the most important features about 
Tanzania’s political economy, which marks it out from many other African countries, 
is the relatively high degree of institutional and political coordination within the state. 
This is largely related to the history of the ruling political party, the CCM, which 
came to power as the Tanganyika National Union (TANU) after an anti-colonial 
struggle that swept it into office in 1961. In 1963 President Nyerere announced that 
Tanzania would become a one party state under TANU. The control of the party over 
the state was achieved through three main methods. First, the party was 
institutionalized from the central National Executive Committee (NEC) down to rural 
communities with the establishment of 10-cell party units at the village level. Second 
the party penetrated the state bureaucracy so that the entire civil service was in effect 
at the direction of the party (Goulbourne 1979). Since the introduction of multi-party 
politics in 1992 there has been a formal de-linking of the party from the state 
administration however in practice the two are still very much intertwined (Kelsall 
2003). The third reason was the fact that other institutions which could have become 
oppositional centres of power, such as co-operatives and the army were integrated 
into the party.  
 
The apparent party strength also relates to the fact that opposition from CCM factions 
within parliament was muted due to the punitive mechanisms available to the party 
whip (Mmuya 1998) and the fact that most of the important decisions on rents 
occurred outside parliamentary debate. Methods of elite control within the party were 
very strong. The NEC and the Central Committee took on the role of controlling the 
elite within the party. The Central Committee controlled party patronage through 
monitoring the activities of members and recommending appointments and removals 
of party officers or even expulsion of members (Van Cranenburg 1990; Skinlo 2007). 
Tight elite control even at the very top is evident from the fact that there have been 
quite regular culls of senior members of cabinet and the party if they were found to be 
engaged in corruption during the liberalisation period.  
 
The advent of multiparty elections has not threatened the hegemonic position of the 
CCM within the state. In fact, CCM has increased its control in each round of multi-
party elections. Over time, the opposition parties have suffered from a lack of funding 
and internal divisions and have received a lower percentage of the vote in each 
subsequent national election. The CCM has increased its parliamentary representation 
from 78% in the first multiparty elections in 1995 to 87.3% in 2005. The well 
developed and inclusive institutional structures of the CCM party have been able to 
largely contain factional competition. This gives the state a degree of central political 
control that has allowed it to pursue rent reduction in certain areas, without 
threatening the political position of the CCM party. Reducing rent seeking in public 
finances also presented a large payoff to the central state in terms of increased aid 
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flows directly through the budget which made it worth while for the state to pursue 
this agenda.  
 
Beyond these institutional reasons there are also reasons related to Tanzania’s wider 
social and economic structure. The low level of rural economic differentiation during 
the socialist Ujamaa period and the lack of industrialisation led to more muted 
factional competition as the rural elite and intermediate classes that often play the role 
of political entrepreneurs were less strong in Tanzania. In a longer historical 
perspective, the comparatively short period of struggle for independence and its 
predominantly peaceful nature circumscribed the legacy of political organisation in 
Tanzania. The more subdued level of political organisation outside the structures of 
the CCM is also part of the reason why opposition parties have had very little impact 
on the strength of the CCM within the state. Within the CCM this also means that 
power within the party is more diffuse and no one faction can raise enough political 
support to completely dominate other factions within the party.  
 
The diffuse power structure within the CCM is one of the reasons why power within 
the party seems to be centralized in Tanzania, as there appear to be few solid blocks 
of opposition within the party. However, while factions are weak, the centre seems to 
lack power when it comes to overruling internal factions that coalesce to protect other 
forms of rent and transfers. This is evident from some of the cases of grand corruption 
that have come to light where the top leadership was not able to override networks 
within the party who supported deals that were manifestly bad for the interests of the 
country and indeed for the leadership (Khan and Gray 2006).  
 
The capacity of the state to manage rents related to land and industrial policy are 
complicated by the historically difficult relationship between the CCM and the 
business sector. Prior to independence the party was led by quite a narrow section of 
intermediate class groups who entrenched their power through the party-state during 
the Ujamaa socialist period (Shivji 1976). During this period, the party officially 
disavowed capitalist development in its pursuit for a more egalitarian socialist 
economy. The private business sector which was dominated by foreign capitalists and 
the Asian-Tanzanian commercial class was effectively cut out of the extensive rents 
created during Ujamaa while the nascent rural capitalist class was suppressed through 
the policy of villagisation and the interdiction of independent co-operatives.  
 
While the state’s attitude to the private sector has changed dramatically during the 
liberalisation period, the domestic African capitalist class is still very small and many 
of the new growth sectors, such as mining, are dominated by foreign capital. The links 
between the private sector and the Party are becoming increasingly evident (Kelsall 
2003) yet the state’s management of rents and transfers to support Tanzania’s 
domestic businesses remain politically complicated. Further, while the state appears to 
have been successful in terms of offering certain forms of subsidies and incentives to 
attract foreign capital, this has mainly remained in profitable areas such as natural 
resources and some low value added manufacturing. To bring about a shift into more 
productive activities would require the state to engage in a more complex system of 
encouragement and disciplining of domestic capitalists. These governance capabilities 
are arguably vital for long-term economic development, but the political space for it 
has to be created internally and is likely to be opposed by powerful donors. 
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3. Conclusions  
Good governance reforms are based on theoretical propositions that are unrealistic for 
most if not all developing countries. However, some developing countries like 
Tanzania have done well with good governance reforms for a while because reforms 
of public finances allowed donors to pump significantly greater aid flows through 
national budgets. In addition, more transparent protection for foreign investors 
allowed greater FDI in natural resources. The question though is whether domestic 
productive capacities are being significantly enhanced. The implementation of good 
governance reforms was supposed to make the economy as a whole more efficient, 
benefiting all sectors through greater market efficiency. There is little evidence of 
such a broad based economic takeoff in countries like Tanzania. The development of 
a domestic African capitalism with local entrepreneurs who are able to compete in 
global markets is not much in evidence.  
 
The historical evidence of sustained development and the analysis of heterodox 
economics suggest there are good reasons why markets by themselves are unlikely to 
result in the development of national capitalism. This is because markets in 
developing countries face significant market failures. Domestic capitalists with 
limited initial capabilities are unlikely to be able to access capital markets to finance 
relatively long periods of learning, or to acquire the assets and land they require in 
relatively inefficient asset markets. Addressing these market failures requires high 
levels of governance capabilities of a very different type. We have described these as 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities. There is no blueprint for these capabilities 
because the appropriate capabilities depend on the specific market failures that 
particular countries face, but also on the political constraints that determine the types 
of interventions that are likely to work in different contexts.  
 
Ironically, Tanzania has a relatively favourable political endowment because of its 
relatively long history of nation-building and party-building. Despite this, the internal 
factions of the ruling party appear to be diffuse and difficult to discipline. The 
development of significant rent management capabilities would require improved 
capabilities to discipline internal political factions so that the allocation of some 
significant rents can be made on explicitly developmental criteria to address market 
failures. This in turn requires a very different discourse about governance priorities so 
that the political consensus could slowly be constructed to allow some of these 
growth-enhancing governance capabilities to be strengthened. The real danger of the 
good governance agenda is that the space for these important governance discussions 
has been significantly reduced by defining good governance as the governance reform 
agenda for developing countries.  
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